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I. Introduction
Both in the United States and elsewhere, 2002 saw a significant increase in the enforce-
ment of laws designed to curb transnational corruption and bribery in commercial trans-
actions. The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) contin-
ued issuing country reviews during 2002, which are designed to measure compliance with
and implementation of the Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials
in International Business Transactions (OECD Convention).' Likewise, the Council of Eu-
rope and the Group of States Against Corruption (GRECO) have continued evaluating the
anti-corruption efforts of the States Parties to the Criminal Law Convention on Corrup-
tion.2 Additional states have also signed the Civil Law Convention on Corruption.' In
addition, the Organization of American States has developed substantially and is now
*A number of individuals have contributed to this article, including the FCPA Practice Group at Miller &
Chevalier Chartered: Lucinda A. Low, Homer F. Moyer,Jr.,John E. Davis, Kathryn Cameron Atkinson,James
G. Tillen, and Leigh Bacon; Richard Werksman and Allen Keiser contributed to the sections on developments
concerning the enforcement of international anti-bribery treaties. The article was edited by Nicole M. Healy,
an attorney at Wilson Sonsini Goodrich & Rosati in Palo Alto, California.
1. Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Country Reports, available at httpJ/www.
oecd.org/EN/document/0,,EN-document-0-nodirectorate-no-3-16889-0,00.htnl (last visited Mar. 11, 2003)
[hereinafter Country Reports].
2. Group of States Against Corruption, Public Evaluation Reports, available at http://www.greco.coe.int/
evaluations/cyclel/EvallReports.htm (last visited Mar. 11, 2003).
3. Council of Europe, Cbart of signatures and ratifications of a treaty, available at http://conventions.coe.int/
Treaty/EN/searchsig.asp?NT= 174&CM= I&DF=06/09/02 (last visited Mar. 11, 2003) [hereinafter Civil
Law Convention].
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implementing a follow-up mechanism to its Inter-American Convention against Corruption
(ICAC).4 Each of these developments will be discussed in turn.
I. U.S. Developments'
A. FCPA ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS
The U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) and the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) were actively involved in enforcing the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) in
2002. The year's enforcement actions also featured several instances of international co-
operation among U.S. enforcement authorities and their counterparts in OECD and non-
OECD countries. These enforcement successes were tempered, however, by two court
decisions (U.S. v. Kay and SEC v. Mattson) that restricted the scope of the FCPA. The two
federal district courts, both located in Texas, held that the FCPA prohibition on payments
"to obtain or retain business" did not apply to payments to reduce tax liabilities or custom
duties. The government has appealed both decisions. Affirmation of the lower court deci-
sions could lead to amendment of the FCPA to explicitly cover such payments in order for
the United States to comply with the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention.
1. United States v. Kay and Murphy
In the early spring of 2002, Douglas Murphy and David Kay, the president and vice-
president, respectively, of American Rice, Inc., a U.S. corporation and "issuer," were in-
dicted in a criminal prosecution brought by the DOJ in federal district court in Texas. The
DOJ charged Murphy and Kay with twelve counts of violating the FCPA, alleging that they
had authorized payments to customs officials in Haiti to reduce customs duties and sales
taxes owed by the company. On April 16, 2002, the court dismissed the indictment against
Murphy and Kay on the grounds that it failed to state the elements of an offense under 15
U.S.C. §§ 78dd-l(a) and 78dd-2(a). The court reasoned that improper payments made to
reduce customs duties and sales taxes were outside the scope of the FCPA because they
were not made to "obtain or retain business." In so doing, the court rejected the Govern-
ment's argument that the FCPA applies to all bribes made for the purpose of obtaining or
retaining business, not just those payments made to secure new business or renew existing
business. The court relied heavily on the legislative history of the FCPA, particularly what
it cited as Congress' failure to amend the "obtain or retain business" language to cover
payments made for "other improper advantage" as well.
The DOJ has appealed the court's decision. The outcome of the DOJ's appeal will be
watched closely both domestically and internationally. Affirmation of the district court's
holding would leave the U.S. non-compliant with the requirements of the OECD Con-
vention, at least in the Fifth Circuit.
After the DOJ's prosecution was dismissed, the SEC filed a civil action against Murphy,
Kay, and Lawrence Theriot, a company consultant, also in federal district court in Texas.
The SEC complaint alleges that Kay authorized over $500,000 in bribery payments to
4. Organization of American States, Follow-up to the Inter-American Convention against Corruption, available
at http://www.oas.org/juridico/englishlfollowup.htm (last visited Mar. 11, 2003).
5. This and the succeeding section were prepared by the FCPA Practice Group of Miller & Chevalier
Chartered. © 2003 Miller & Chevalier Chartered. All rights reserved.
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Haitian customs officials and directed that those payments be recorded as routine business
expenditures. Mr. Theriot is alleged to have aided and abetted Kay's and Murphy's viola-
tions. The complaint further alleges that Mr. Murphy knew of the bribery scheme but took
no action to stop it and is liable as a "control person" for Kay's actions. This may be the
first time such a theory has been used in the FCPA context. The civil action against Murphy,
Kay, and Theriot is pending.
2. SEC v. Mattson and Harris
As discussed in last year's International Legal Developments in Review, the SEC and DOJ
in 2001 settled several matters involving Baker Hughes, a Texas oilfield services company,
and alleged payments to an Indonesian tax official. In 2001, the SEC entered into settlement
agreements with the Company, the Indonesian affiliate of a large accounting firm (KPMG),
and an Indonesian national who is a partner in the affiliate accounting firm. Two corporate
officers, Eric L. Mattson and James W Harris, contested the charges against them.
The SEC civil complaint filed against Mattson, former Chief Financial Officer of Baker
Hughes, and Harris, former Controller of Baker Hughes, alleged that they violated both
the antibribery and accounting provisions of the FCPA in authorizing a payment to an
Indonesian tax official in exchange for the reduction of a tax assessment owed by an In-
donesian corporation controlled by Baker Hughes. The two were also charged with aiding
and abetting Baker Hughes' accounting violations. In September of 2002, a federal district
court in Texas ruled that the SEC had failed to state a claim under the antibribery provisions.
The district court followed the reasoning in the Kay case that the payment at issue did not
fall within the scope of the "obtain or retain" business prong of the FCPA. The government
has appealed the dismissal of the bribery claim; the books and records claims against Matt-
son and Harris are pending.
3. United States v. King; United States v. Halford; United States v. Reitz
The International Legal Developments in Review: 2001 also discussed indictments against
three officers and one agent of Owl Securities & Investments, Ltd. (OSI) for alleged pay-
ments to Costa Rican officials, political parties, party officials, and candidates for public
office to obtain a land concession to develop new port facilities in Costa Rica. The defen-
dants attempted to acquire the land concession on behalf of OSI Proyectos, a Costa Rican
affiliate of OSI.
Robert King, a U.S. citizen and stockholder in OSI (a "domestic concern"), was convicted
on June 24, 2002 of one count of conspiracy and four counts of violating the FCPA. On
November 13, 2002, he was sentenced to 30 months in prison and fined $60,000.
On August 3, 2001, Richard Halford, former Chief Financial Officer of OSI, agreed to
plead guilty to conspiracy to violate the FCPA and three counts of tax evasion for his
participation in raising funds for the payment of the Costa Rican officials. Also on August
3, 2002, Albert Reitz, a former officer and director of OSI, agreed to plead guilty to con-
spiracy to violate the FCPA, mail fraud, making of a false statement, and filing a false tax
return, for his participation in raising funds for the Costa Rican officials. Reitz and Halford
were each sentenced on July 9, 2002, to five years probation and 1,000 hours of community
service, which includes lecturing about corporate fraud.
Pablo Barquero Hernandez ("Barquero"), a Costa Rican national and "agent" of OSI,
remains a fugitive; the United States has requested either his extradition or prosecution by
Costa Rica.
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4. United States v. Sengupta
Two 2002 cases reflect increasing cooperation between the World Bank and the De-
partment of Justice, as well as the DOJ's increasing success in securing the cooperation of
its counterparts in other countries. In June of 2002, Gautam Sengupta, a former Task
Manager with the World Bank's offices in Washington, D.C., pled guilty to one count of
wire fraud and one count of violating the FCPA in a prosecution by the DOJ in federal
district court in Washington, D.C. The DOJ charged that Sengupta entered into an agree-
ment with a Swedish consultant to direct World Bank-funded projects to that consultant
in exchange for kickbacks. Sengupta received a request for a payment from a Kenyan gov-
ernment official in connection with a World Bank-funded project and agreed to pass the
request on to the Swedish consultant, who later paid the official.
The DOJ asserted jurisdiction over Sengupta based on the new prohibition on foreign
persons making corrupt payments while on U.S. territory. Sengupta has not yet been sen-
tenced, however, his plea agreement requires him to pay $127,000 in restitution.
5. United States v. Basu
In a case arising from facts very similar to those in U.S. v. Sengupta, Ramendra Basu, an
Indian national and former Task Manager with the World Bank's office in Washington,
D.C., pled guilty to one count of conspiracy to commit wire fraud and one count of violating
the FCPA. In his plea, entered December 17, 2002, the defendant, who had been respon-
sible for awarding funds for consulting contracts in connection with World Bank devel-
opment projects, admitted to facilitating the payment of a $50,000 bribe to a Kenyan gov-
ernment official via an American and a Swedish consultant. Jurisdiction was premised on a
January 1999 e-mail sent by the defendant in Washington, D.C. to the Swedish consultant.
The e-mail included the bank account number of a Kenyan company that was working with
the American consultant on a World Bank urban transport project in Kenya. The defendant
admitted that he sent the e-mail with the knowledge that the money would be funneled by
the American consultant to the Swedish consultant and eventually to a Kenyan official. The
defendant is required to pay $127,000 in restitution and currently faces a possible maximum
sentence of five years imprisonment and a $100,000 fine.
In both Sengupta and Basu, we understand the Department ofJustice received substantial
cooperation from both the Swedish and Kenyan authorities.
6. United States v. Syncor Taiwan, Inc.
On December 3, 2002, Syncor Taiwan, Inc, a Taiwanese company indirectly wholly-
owned by Syncor International Corp., a California provider of high technology health care
services, pled guilty to one count of violating the FCPA and agreed to pay a $2 million
criminal fine-the maximum statutory penalty for a single violation.
The same day, Syncor International Corp., the issuer-parent, entered into a consent
decree with the Securities and Exchange Commission related to Syncor Taiwan's conduct
and agreed to pay a $500,000 civil fine-the largest fine imposed to date in an FCPA civil
enforcement action by the SEC.
Syncor International Corp. voluntarily disclosed in November 2002 that its planned
merger partner, Cardinal Health Inc., had, in the course of its merger due diligence, dis-
covered evidence of possible improper payments to state-owned healthcare facilities abroad.
According to public papers in the case, Syncor Taiwan paid physicians employed by state-
owned hospitals in Taiwan in order to secure sales of radiopharmaceuticals and to obtain
referrals of patients to medical imaging centers owned and operated by the Company. The
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improper payments, which totaled $457,117, were made with the authorization of the chair-
man of the board of Syncor Taiwan. The payments were recorded as "promotional and
advertising expenses."
Syncor Taiwan, Inc. is the first case in which the Justice Department has criminally pros-
ecuted a foreign subsidiary of a U.S. company under the 1998 amendments to section 78dd-
3 of the FCPA, which extended the FCPA's prohibitions on improper payments to foreign
officials to cover any act in furtherance of such payments by "any person," including foreign
corporations, "while in the territory of the United States." 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-3(a). The plea
agreement states that on several occasions the Chairman of Syncor Taiwan sent e-mails
from California to Taiwan approving budgets for Syncor Taiwan that incorporated amounts
to be paid to officials of state-owned hospitals. The territorial nexus thus appears to be
consistent with the plain language of section 78dd-3, in contrast to earlier civil settlements
such as Baker Hughes, which seemed to be based on an aggressive "effects" standard.
B. DOJ FCPA OPINION PROCEDURE RELEASES
After issuing three opinions in 2001, the DOJ did not issue any opinions in 2002 under
its Opinion Procedure, pursuant to which a requestor can obtain a binding opinion from
DOJ as to its enforcement intentions with respect to a specific proposed transaction.
On January 15, 2003, however, the DOJ issued an opinion that appears to be based on
the activities of Cardinal Health Inc. as discussed above in U.S. v. Syncor. (Opinion Procedure
Release 2003-01 ). An unnamed U.S. issuer ("Issuer") requested clarification of how the DOJ
would view the purchase of the stock of an unnamed company ("Company") where due
diligence revealed that officers of a foreign subsidiary of the Company authorized and made
payments to individuals employed by foreign state-owned entities to obtain and retain busi-
ness. Both the Issuer and the Company disclosed results of investigations into the payment
to the DOJ and the SEC. The Issuer expressed concern that by acquiring the company it
would also acquire potential criminal and civil liability under the FCPA for the past acts of
the Company.
The DOJ indicated that, based on the facts and circumstances as represented by the
Issuer, the Department would take no enforcement action against the Issuer for the pre-
acquisition conduct of its future subsidiary. Among the relevant facts cited in this release
were the remedial actions taken by the Company, including disclosure to the public and
suspension of senior officers and employees implicated in the payments pending the con-
clusion of Company's investigation. The Issuer also represented that it would perform the
following actions once the sale is completed: continued cooperation with the DOJ, SEC,
and foreign law enforcement; appropriate discipline of employees found to have made the
improper payments; disclosure of any additional pre-acquisition payments made by the
Company; extension of Issuer's compliance program to the Company; implementation of
a system of internal controls; and maintenance of accurate books and records.
This opinion and U.S. v. Syncor illustrate the importance of conducting FCPA due dili-
gence in mergers and acquisition. Both the enforcement actions and the release are note-
worthy for the expeditious manner in which they were resolved by the DOJ-roughly a
month elapsed between the disclosure and settlement. This quick action was presumably
to allow the acquisition (which occurred on January 2, 2003) to be completed.
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C. OTHER DEVELOPMENTS
Signed into law in July 2002, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (Pub. L. No. 107-204,116
Star. 745) was passed largely in response to the corporate scandals of the past two years. In
addition to increasing penalties for corporate wrongdoers and avenues of redress for ag-
grieved shareholders, the legislation also shifts the enforcement focus to companies' internal
controls and disclosure obligations. These new "disclosure controls" are broader than the
FCPA's internal controls requirements. New certification requirements for companies and
senior officers highlight the need for management to become aware of questionable pay-
ments and problems with internal controls that raise potential FCPA issues. Audit Com-
mittees are specifically empowered to hire outside investigators to review controls break-
downs and questionable payments. In a trend that will likely affect the FCPA area as well
as others, the legislation appears to have made companies more inclined to make voluntary
disclosures than in the past.
Most significant are a variety of new reporting and disclosure provisions. Sarbanes-Oxley
requires the creation of an employee "hotline" to the Audit Committee. Outside auditors
are required to report evidence of illegal acts to management and the Audit Committee.
For the first time, the law requires attorneys (both in-house and outside) to report evidence
of a material violation of the securities laws (including the FCPA) to management and then
to the Audit Committee if management does not take appropriate remedial action. Imple-
mentation of this requirement is pending at this writing.
II. Other Anti-Bribery Enforcement Actions around the World
A. CANADA
In 2002, a court in Calgary indicted a Canadian firm and two of its executives, as well as
of a U.S. Customs agent, in connection with an alleged bribe to favor the company and
hamper its competitors with respect to entry into the United States. The prosecution
charged that Robert Watts and Paulette Bakke, president and assistant manager of Hydro
Kleen Systems Inc., a refinery cleaning company, bribed Hector Ramirez Garcia, a U.S.
Customs agent, to facilitate the entry of its employees into the United States and to delay
the entry of competitors' employees into the United States. In connection with this ar-
rangement, Hydro Kleen paid Garcia's sole proprietorship between $1,500 and $2,000 a
month to provide immigration consulting services. The three individuals were charged with
violations of Canada's Corruption of Foreign Public Officials Act and of the Criminal Code
of Canada. Mr. Garcia pleaded guilty and served a six-month jail sentence. Upon his release
in February 2003, Mr. Garcia was deported to the United States where he faces prosecution
by the DOJ. The trial of Mr. Watts and Ms. Bakke is scheduled to commence on February
26, 2003.
A related civil lawsuit was filed in Canada by another refinery cleaning company, Inno-
vative Coke Expulsion Inc. ("ICE") on the grounds that Garcia accepted bribes to deny its
employees entry into the United States. ICE also filed a civil RICO suit against Hydro
Kleen, which has a U.S. subsidiary, in the United States. In May 2002, Hydro Kleen paid
ICE $300,000 in settlement.
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B. LESOTHO
In September of 2002, a Canadian firm, Acres International Ltd., was convicted by the
Lesotho High Court of bribing a former government official in connection with a World
Bank-funded project. The Lesotho court found that Acres had made payments to its rep-
resentative in Lesotho knowing that they would be used to bribe the government official
responsible for the project and fined the company $2.2 million. Acres has appealed the
decision.
Acres is not alone in being accused of corruption in connection with the project in
Lesotho. A number of other firms, including companies from France, Germany, Italy, South
Africa, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom have been so accused, and additional verdicts
are expected in 2003.
Earlier in the year, the Sanctions Committee of the World Bank determined that the
evidence was not sufficient to justify the imposition of sanctions under the Bank's revised
Consultants' Guidelines against Acres and two other accused firms whose contracts had
been financed in part with Bank funds.
C. SLOVAKIA
In October of 2001, representatives of Germany's Siemens Business Services were
charged with offering a payment to the head of the selection commission in connection
with a tender for the provision of information services to the state treasury. The firm was
subsequently excluded from the tender process, although in April of 2002, the Slovak Fi-
nance Ministry allowed the firm to participate. Most recently, in August 2002, a competing
firm asked Transparency International to review the tender process.
D. JAPAN
In August 2002, the Tokyo District Public Prosecutor's office was reported to have
opened an investigation into Mitsui & Co., Japan's second largest trading company, for
alleged payments to a Mongolian official to secure orders for a project funded by the Mon-
golian government's official development assistance program. If successful, this would be
the first prosecution under Japan's foreign anticorruption law, which was passed in 1998
pursuant to the OECD Convention. The status of this investigation is unclear at this
writing.
HI. International Anti-corruption Treaties
A. OECD CONVENTION
1. Signatures, Ratifications, and Entries into Force of the Convention
and Implementing Legislation
As of October 10, 2002, all OECD member countries, except Ireland, had signed and
ratified the OECD Convention, which has entered into force for these countries and for
all non-member countries that have signed the treaty.6 During 2002, implementing
6. See OECD Convention, Dec. 17, 1997, 37 I.L.M. 1(1998). The Convention entered into force February
15, 1999. The information discussed herein is available at http://www.oecd.org/daf/nocorruption/.
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legislation enacted by Brazil, Chile, and the United Kingdom entered into force, leaving
only Turkey without such legislation.'
2. Country Examinations
The OECD conducted a Phase I examination of Ireland in June of 2002 and issued a
report.' Phase II examinations of Finland and the United States were also conducted in
2002, and the OECD released reports of prior examinations.9 After a country visit and
examination of Finland in 2001, the OECD released its report in May 2002.10 The OECD
visited and examined the United States and released its report in December of 2002.11 Also
in 2002, the OECD visited and examined: Iceland, Germany, and Bulgaria."2 No reports
have been released yet for these countries.
3. Update on OECD Recommendation Regarding Tax Deductibility of Bribes
In October of 2002, the OECD made available an update to the implementation of the
OECD Recommendation on the tax deductibility of bribes to foreign public officials in
countries that are parties to the bribery convention. 3 New Zealand adopted a law in 2002
making "bribes paid to foreign and domestic public officials in the conduct of business non-
deductible."' 4 The United Kingdom's 2002 legislation provides that tax relief is not avail-
able with respect to any payment made outside the United Kingdom where a corresponding
payment in the UK would constitute a criminal offense."t
B. COUNCIL OF EUROPE CONVENTIONS AND THE GRECO
1. Civil Law Convention on Corruption
During 2002, Lithuania added its signature to the Civil Law Convention.' 6 Bosnia and
Herzegovina, Greece, Poland, Romania, and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia
ratified the Convention in 2002.'1
2. Criminal Law Convention on Corruption
a. Signatures, Ratifications, and Entries into Force
The Criminal Law Convention on Corruption 8 saw additional signatures and ratifica-
tions in 2002.' 9 Mexico added its signature ad referendum. 0 Bosnia and Herzegovina, Fin-
7. Ireland has implementing legislation in force. OECD, Anti-Bribeiy Convention: National Implementing
Legislation, available at http://www.oecd.org/pdf/M00017000/MO0017037.pdf(last visited Mar. 11, 2003).





13. OECD, Update on the Implementation of the OECD Recommendation on the Tax Deductibility of Bribes to
Foreign Public Offuials in Countries parties to the Bribery Convention, available at http-J/www.oecd.org/pdf/
M00037000/M00037458.pdf (last visited Mar. 11, 2003).
14. Id. at 5.
15. Id. at 6.
16. Civil Law Convention, supra note 3.
17. Id.
18. See Council of Europe Criminal Law Convention on Corruption, Jan. 27, 1999, 38 I.L.M. 505 (1999),
available at http://conventions.coe.int. The Convention entered into force January 7, 2002.
19. Council of Europe, Criminal Law Convention on Corruption, avaiableathttpiJ/conventions.coe.intTreaty/
EN/searchsig.asp?NT = 173&CMv= I&DF = 27/09/02 (last visited Mar. 11, 2003).
20. Id.
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land, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, and Yugoslavia ratified the
Convention.2 t The Convention entered into force during 2002 for Albania, Bosnia and
Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Hungary,
Latvia, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, and the former
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.22
b. GRECO Monitoring
During 2002, GRECO visited Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Czech Republic,
Denmark, Malta, Moldova, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, the former Yugoslav Re-
public of Macedonia, and the United States, and completed the First Round of Evalua-
tions.23 GRECO adopted Reports for Poland, Romania, Germany, Lithuania, Greece, Bul-
garia, Croatia, Latvia, Denmark, Norway, Albania, Malta, and the former Yugoslav Republic
of Macedonia.
2 4
C. THE INTER-AMERICAN CONVENTION AGAINST CORRUPTION: 2002 DEVELOPMENTS
25
Unlike the OECD Convention or the COE Criminal Law Convention, the Inter-
American Convention Against Corruption (ICAC)26 initially contained no peer review or
other evaluation mechanism. In 2001, the ICAC adopted a follow-up mechanism, which
began functioning in 2002.27
The mechanism was created by the adoption of the recommendations issued by the OAS
Working Group on Probity and Public Ethics, pursuant to the Report of Buenos Aires
signed by the Foreign Ministers of twenty States Parties, in San Jose, Costa Rica on June
4, 2001.2 s The Report sets forth the basic criteria, structure, and guidelines for the peer
review mechanism. 9 The mechanism consists of two entities, the Conference of States
21. Id.
22. The following countries have signed the Convention, but with declarations or reservations. Reserva-
tions: Bulgaria, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Denmark (the Faroe Islands and Greenland are presently ex-
cluded), Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, the Netherlands, Portugal, Slovenia, and Yugoslavia. Declarations: the
Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Poland, and Portugal. Id.
23. Council of Europe, First Evaluation Round, available at http://www.greco.coe.int/ (last visited Mar. 11,
2003).
24. Id.
25. All the documents cited or referred to in this Section, including the Convention and the Report of
Buenos Aires can be found on the OAS Web site, available at www.oas.org/juridico/english.
26. See Inter-American Convention Against Corruption, 35 I.L.M. 724 (1996); Specialized Conference on
the Draft Inter-American Convention Against Corruption, OEA/Ser.K/XXX1V.1 CICOR/doc.16/96 rev. 2,9
Sept. 1996, at 6. The United States ratified the ICAC on September 15, 2000. The instrument of ratification
also contains certain declarations and understandings.
27. In 2002, Brazil ratified the ICAC. As of February 1, 2003, twenty-eight members of the OAS had ratified
and deposited their instruments of ratification, leaving only Haiti, which had reportedly ratified the treaty but
never deposited, and the five English-speaking countries of the eastern Caribbean as non-ratifiers. All the
ratifying countries have joined the follow-up mechanism except Belize.
28. Two more signed later in 2001 and five more States Parties adopted the mechanism in 2002, bringing
the total to twenty-seven.
29. The Report states that the purposes of the mechanism are: "[tio promote implementation of the Con-
vention ... to follow up on the commitments made by the States Parties to the Convention ... and to facilitate
technical cooperation activities; the exchange of information, experiences, and best practices; and the harmo-
nization of the legislation of the States Parties." Report of Buenos Aires, supra note 25, § 1. The Report noted
the need to "take account of the principles of sovereignty, nonintervention and the juridical equality of the
states, as well as the need to respect the Constitution and the fundamental principles of the legal system of
each State." Id. § 2.
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Parties, that is, the Twenty-Seven States Parties to the Convention, and a Committee of
Experts, consisting of a member designated by each State Party.
The Committee met for the first time in February 2002 in Washington, D.C. Because
the topic of site visits was considered sensitive, the parties decided that no site visits would
take place unless they were made part of all evaluations, but that any State Party could
request one in connection with its own evaluation. 0 The Committee also decided that it
would seek input from civil society only in accordance with established OAS procedures.
Finally, the Committee decided that six sections of the Convention would be assessed in
the first round, which was expected to last until 2004.11 Those sections are: standards of
conduct and their enforcement, financial disclosure, anticorruption oversight bodies, par-
ticipation of civil society relating to Article III; Article XIV, Assistance and Cooperation;
and Article XVIII, Central Authorities, which coordinate assistance and international co-
operation.
The Committee met a second time, also in Washington, in May 2002. The Committee
developed questionnaires to be answered by the States Parties, which are used to conduct
evaluations and make recommendations. The Committee also addressed the methodology
for the review process, and discussed the country report outline for the first round.
The assessment process for the first four states, Argentina, Colombia, Nicaragua, and
Paraguay, began in September. 2 In early December, ten of the twenty-two States Parties
who responded to a questionnaire issued by the OAS, including the first four to be assessed,
permitted their responses to be posted on the OAS Web site.
30. There were no site visits in the evaluations of the first four countries.
31. During the summer of 2002, Brazil, Grenada, Guayana, St.Vincent, the Grenadines, and Suriname joined
the Committee, which may prolong the evaluations.
32. Uruguay, Panama, Ecuador, and Chile are due to be reviewed in the second round.
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